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On January 11, 2007, Charles "Cully" Stimson, then the deputy assistant
secretary of defense for detainee affairs, gave a radio interview to Federal
News Radio in which he stated he found it "shocking" that many of the
nation's top law firms represent detainees at Guant~namo Bay.' Stimson was
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1. Audio Recording: Charles "Cully" Stimson, Interview with Federal News Radio (Jan.
11, 2007), http://www.federalnewsradio.com/emedia/59677.wma [hereinafter Charles "Cully"
Stimson (audio recording)]; see also Editorial, Unveiled Threats: A Bush Appointee's Crude
Gambit on Detainees' Legal Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2007, at A18 (reporting on and
discussing Stimson's interview).
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implicitly equating the morality of those attorneys with the morality of their
"terrorist" clients. Stimson was blunt in his critique: "I think, quite honestly,
when corporate CEOs see that those firms are representing the very terrorists
who hit their bottom line back in 2001, those CEOs are going to make those
law firms choose between representing terrorists or representing reputable
firms," 3 The legal profession's response was swift. Many bar associations,
law firms involved in Guantfnamo representations, and individual attorneys
distributed statements and wrote letters to the editors of newspapers, while
many more lawyers talked in the hallways.4 The legal profession came down
firmly on the side of nonaccountability: the lawyers who were defending the
Guantdnamo "terrorists" were not to be morally equated with their clients.
Nonaccountability is a fundamental and controversial tenant of the American
legal system that holds that attorneys are not morally accountable for who their
clients are, what their clients have done, or what attorneys will do for their
clients as long as it is within the bounds of the law. 6 In the legal-representation
2. Charles "Cully" Stimson (audio recording), supra note 1, at 3:48; see also Editorial,
supra note 1, at A18.
3. Charles "Cully" Stimson (audio recording), supra note 1, at 3:39; see also Editorial,
supra note 1, at A18.
4. See, e.g., Theodore B. Olson & Neal Katyal, We Want Tough Arguments, LEGAL TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2007, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/documents/Olson-
Katyall-22-07.pdf (calling Stimson's remarks "unfortunate" and chiding him for attacking
lawyers representing detainees and "the legal profession as a whole"); Thomas P. Sullivan, Letter
to the Editor, Right to a Lawyer Applies to Everyone, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at A18
(defending the law firm Jenner & Block for its representation of GuanatAnamo Bay prisoners);
Press Release, ABA, Statement by ABA President Karen J. Mathis on Remarks of Cully Stimson,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, in January 11, 2007 Federal News
Radio Interview (Jan. 12, 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/
statement/statement.cfm?releaseid=65 (identifying Stimson's remarks as "deeply offensive to
members of the legal profession, and ... to all Americans"); Press Release, Law School Deans,
Statement of Law Deans (Jan. 15, 2007), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
documents/pdf/News & Events/LawDeansStatement9.pdf (expressing the view of over 150
law-school deans condemning Stimson's comments: "Our American legal tradition has honored
lawyers who, despite their personal beliefs, have zealously represented mass murderers, suspected
terrorists, and Nazi marchers. At this moment in time, when our courts have endorsed the right of
the Guantanamo detainees to be heard in courts of law, it is critical that qualified lawyers provide
effective representation to these individuals."); Nina Totenberg, Pentagon Remark on Detainees
Stuns Legal Experts, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 13, 2007), http://npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=6849592 (reporting New York University School of Law
Professor Stephen Gillers's comment that "[Stimson] should be sent back to basic civics classes
on the American adversary system and forced to take a quiz before he's allowed to resume his
duties").
5. See, e.g., Olson & Katyal, supra note 4; Press Release, Law School Deans, supra note 4.
6. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF.
L. REV. 669, 671 (1978) ("Lawyers have claimed, since at least the days of John Adams, that they
are 'independent' from their clients in that they are not morally responsible for their clients'
actions.") (internal citation omitted); see also Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of
Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 507-08 (1994) (describing the
principle of nonaccountability and calling it "necessary to the effective working of the adversary
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context, the client sets the objectives of the representation and participates in
decisions regarding how to achieve those objectives; the attorney acts as a
facilitator and an advisor. Under the nonaccountability theory, the attorney is
not morally accountable for the objectives of the client or the consequences of
achieving those objectives. Attorneys are, therefore, disincentivized to
exercise their own moral judgments when choosing whom to represent.
Over the last sixty years, this concept has been both criticized and supported
by academics.7 Despite academic criticism of nonaccountability, the debate
appears to generate little discussion among legal practitioners, the majority of
whom still widely approve of the concept.
8
This Article explores nonaccountability, why it holds such sway over the
legal community, and, in particular, why corporate-transactional practitioners,
whose roles as attorneys are least supported by the traditional arguments in
favor of nonaccountability, are given this "benefit." 9 This Article argues that
corporate lawyers cannot accurately claim that they are not morally responsible
for their work on behalf of corporate clients-clients who have a legally
impaired ability to engage in independent moral reasoning, and who function
in a world of relatively minimal legal oversight. In abandoning the notion of
nonaccountability, this Article encourages corporate-transactional attorneys to
not only think more deeply about the value of their work to society, but also to
better communicate that value.
The first part of this Article defines nonaccountability. The traditional
justifications for lawyer nonaccountability include: (1) the American adversary
system requires each side to a dispute to have a vigorous advocate; (2) lawyers
are needed to represent all people in order to serve as a check on government
abuse; (3) a lawyer is often necessary to provide individuals with meaningful
access to the legal system; and (4) the legal system provides a public forum for
discussion of disputed moral views. These arguments, although traditionally
applied to all areas of legal practice, are most persuasive when dealing with
system"). This concept has been referred to by different names but is most commonly called
"nonaccountability." See Painter, supra, at 508 (referring to this theory as moral
interdependence); Scott R. Peppet, Lawyer's Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration:
The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV.
475, 500-01 & n.92 (2005) (discussing different names for nonaccountability).
7. Compare Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 15 (1951)
("[T]here is nothing unethical in taking a bad case or defending the guilty or advocating what you
don't believe in. It is ethically neutral."), with Painter, supra note 6, at 507-12 (arguing for
"moral interdependence" of lawyers and their clients rather than "moral independence"), and
David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the
Ku Klux Klan?, GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030, 1039-40 (1995) [hereinafter Wilkins, Race, Ethics,
and the First Amendment] (noting that both refusing and agreeing to represent clients carry
"moral significance").
8. Painter, supra note 6, at 557.
9. Richard Painter has criticized the allowance of nonaccountability in the corporate
context, arguing that corporate attorneys are morally interdependent with their clients for their
joint actions. Painter, supra note 6, at 553-55.
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criminal proceedings and become less persuasive in the field of civil litigation.
These arguments are least persuasive when the client is a business entity
engaged in forward-looking transactional work. This Article focuses on
business-entity clients that are not individuals or alternate identities for an
individual, and that only act through others, their employees, or agents.'
0
As discussed later, the traditional arguments in favor of nonaccountability
are not easily applied to corporate-transactional work for several reasons.
First, this work does not take place in an adversary system in which there is, in
theory, a neutral decision-maker and fair process. Second,
corporate-transactional work generally does not act as a check on
governmental power. Third, because for-profit corporations are legal fictions
treated as individuals for some purposes of the law, but are not autonomous
moral actors capable of free will or autonomous responsible citizenship, they
lack many of the key characteristics that justify an attorney's suspension of
moral judgment. Finally, transactional work generally does not arbitrate moral
disputes in a public forum, but instead deals with private conduct out of the
public eye.
Consequently, attorneys doing transactional work for business entities need
their own justifications for nonaccountability. The most powerful argument is
that by helping these clients order their future activities, lawyers can assist with
preventing future illegal activity. For example, by helping a business-entity
client create a sexual-harassment policy, the client might avoid incidents of
sexual harassment in the workplace.
Unlike the justifications for criminal and litigation lawyering, however, the
argument for nonaccountability of attorneys representing corporate clients is
not systemic. Representation of a corporation that is trying to comply with
environmental laws and representation of a corporation that is trying to get
around the spirit of those same laws while still not violating them, deserve
different moral treatment. Likewise, representing a tobacco corporation in
setting up a sexual-harassment policy has a stronger claim of lawyer
nonaccountability (helping the client comply with law) than representing that
same corporation in bringing its product to a new and unregulated overseas
market, which may be legal, but potentially immoral.'" Without systematic
justifications, lawyers doing corporate-transactional work for business entities
must value the work by considering the morality of the work itself.
12
10. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to business-entity clients as corporations. This
Article defines transactional work as work designed to shape future conduct and taking place
outside of a courtroom setting, as opposed to litigation work that deals mainly with the
consequences of past actions.
11. Painter, supra note 6, at 555.
12. Banks have been criticized harshly for their role in the mortgage collapse that led to the
recent recession. See, e.g., Hugo Dixon & Agnes T. Crane, Facing a Pay Cut or a Pitchfork,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at B2 (advocating that governments and regulators should lower
bankers' compensation after the industry's awarding of exceedingly large bonuses in 2009). But
[Vol. 60:275
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Corporate-transactional attorneys may also turn to a general economic
argument. By helping a client achieve its legal needs, the attorney frees the
client to pursue the maximum economic growth within the bounds of the law,
thus enabling it to reach its full business potential. A problem with this line of
reasoning is that it presumes the free market is an area where actors can claim
exemption from ordinary morality simply because the market can be, but is not
always, a social good. 13 For example, slavery had a strong market basis, but a
lawyer who worked to facilitate slavery could not escape the moral
implications of his work by pointing to the market.
This Article will also examine the ways in which the legal system does not
support nonaccountability. Lawyers cannot escape the reality that, in the
American legal system, they have broad discretion in choosing clients and can
also choose to specialize in representing certain causes or types of clients.14 In
making these choices, lawyers sometimes align themselves with the goals and
issues of their clients, such as representing pro- or anti-gun control clients, or,
more frequently, lawyers align themselves with the underlying systemic goals
that the legal representation advances. As a result, a lawyer's choice of clients
speaks to the values of the lawyer and not just the need for a paycheck. The
reality is that in many practice settings the stark separation between lawyer and
client is often an artificial construct.
This does not imply that corporate-transactional work is less valuable than
litigation. In fact, many would agree that preventing the breach of laws is
better than simply cleaning up after they already have been broken. After all,
it is generally better to prevent pollution than to litigate over its clean up. But
lawyers doing this work should recognize that they cannot rely on systematic
justifications like litigators can. They are morally accountable when they
facilitate actions on behalf of their clients and should take this into
consideration when agreeing to represent a particular client or take on a
particular assignment.
lawyers were also instrumental to this collapse in that they facilitated many of these mortgages by
securitizing the loans. Looking back on the role lawyers played, can the legal profession honestly
say that lawyers did not play a part? See Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: The Role of
Lawyers in the Global Financial Crisis 8, 16 (Duke Law Scholarship Repository, Working Paper
No. 8, 2010), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/workingpapers/8 (stating that "[i]t can
be risky to help facilitate transactions that violate norms even though the transactions would not
actually violate law").
13. See Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 126 (stating that although the only
social responsibility of a business is to increase its profits, the business still must "stay within the
rules of the game, which is to say, engage[] in open and free competition without deception or
fraud").
14. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 7, at 15 (noting that an attorney can choose to accept a "bad
case" or to represent a position in which he does not believe); Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First
Amendment, supra note 7, at 1039-40 (discussing a lawyer's "moral right" to refuse a case).
15. See Painter, supra note 6, at 553-55 (discussing some of the ways that corporate
attorneys and their clients become intertwined).
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Moral accountability for transactional attorneys also does not mean that
corporations do not deserve access to attorneys for their transactional needs.
This Article assumes that for every corporate need, there is a lawyer who is
willing to satisfy it. Lawyers, like the rest of humanity, have a broad range of
moral views. For example, although many people might object to helping a
tobacco company sell cigarettes to a new market, such as a country with
lenient smoking laws, there will inevitably be many lawyers who see nothing
wrong with this. The reality of the legal profession seems to be that as long as
a client can pay, he will find a lawyer willing to represent him. But that lawyer
cannot claim an exemption from a moral discussion.
This Article ultimately concludes that the American legal profession does
not have a system of nonaccountability, but instead, a sliding scale of
justifications. On one end of the scale is criminal litigation, in which lawyers
can justify their work by referring to the system in which it takes place and not
the content of the work. Civil litigation is also on this end, as it is closely
aligned with criminal law because it rests within the adversary system. On the
other end of the scale are corporate transactions, which are justified by the
content of the work and not by reference to an overarching system of justice.
But on whichever end of the scale a lawyer falls, the lawyer is not immune
from having to articulate the social and moral value of the legal work. The
overly broad notion that lawyers are not accountable for the goals of their
clients serves as a crutch that prevents corporate lawyers from considering and
articulating the moral value of their services. Corporate lawyers, and society,
are better off if lawyers dig into the reason why their work offers value to the
world.
I. WHY THE THEORIES THAT SUPPORT NONACCOUNTABILITY ARE
PARTICULARLY WEAK FOR TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS
A. Zealous Representation and Nonaccountability
The dominant model of lawyering over the last thirty years asserts that the
lawyer is ethically bound to pursue the client's interests "zealously within the
bounds of the law." 16 David Luban describes zealous representation as rooted
in the principle of partisanship-that a lawyer must, within the constraints of
professional advocacy, maximize the likelihood that the client's objectives will
16. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983) ("A [l]awyer [s~hould
[r]epresent a [c]lient [z]ealously [w]ithin the [b]ounds of the [f]aw."); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009) ("A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication
to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."). But see Murray
L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 670-71
(1978) (distinguishing the "nonadvocate" lawyer from the "advocate" lawyer, arguing that the
professional principles that apply to the latter should not transfer to the former).
[Vol. 60:275
The Moral Responsibility of the Corporate Lawyer
be met. 17 Indeed, some lawyers interpret this to mean that everything not
forbidden is compelled if it will advance the client's interests.18
The principle of nonaccountability is often discussed as a natural corollary to
the idea of partisanship: if the lawyer must represent the client zealously and
hold the client's goals as primary, then the lawyer should not be legally,
professionally, or morally accountable for the means used or the ends
achieved, as long as those means or ends are within the bounds of the law.' 9
Advocating a position contrary to one's personal beliefs is, under this
construction, "ethically neutral." 20  Richard Wasserstrom describes this as
"role-differentiated behavior. ' 21 This notion that "lawyers are expected to give
17. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 11 (1988) [hereinafter
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE]. Using "zealousness" as the boundary poses significant
problems because where the "bounds of the law" lie is sometimes the issue at hand. In addition,
the adversarial approach usually results in the lawyer erring on the side of the client's interests
when determining the bounds of the law. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN
DIGNITY 26 (2007) (explaining that "zealously within the bounds of the law" could mean
"pushing claims to the limit of the law and then a bit further, into the realm of what is colorably
the limit of the law" (internal quotation marks omitted)); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for
Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 470 (1990) [hereinafter Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers]
("[T]he claim of indeterminacy directly challenges the traditional model's assertion that legal
boundaries effectively mediate between a lawyer's private duty to clients and her public
commitments to the legal framework.").
18. See Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, supra note 17, at 484 (stating that because of
the "open-textured nature of many legal questions, the indeterminacy thesis has the potential for
generating an argumentative nihilism in which any construction of the law is as good as any other
and in which there are no restrictions on zealous advocacy" (internal citations omitted)).
19. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 12 (stating that within the standard
conception of American legal ethics, the principle of partisanship requires that the lawyer "must,
within the established constraints on professional behavior, maximize the likelihood that the
client's objectives will be attained"). Many lawyers and the official professional codes assert,
either directly or indirectly, that lawyers, when acting as zealous advocates, are "neither legally,
professionally, nor morally accountable for the means used or the ends achieved." Schwartz,
supra note 16, at 673. Whether these ideas naturally follow is discussed at length below.
Philosophers may have a different way to unpack the notion of responsibility and accountability.
See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH ch. X (Oceana Publ'n 1960) (1930) (discussing the
nature of the legal profession and the issues arising with regard to lawyers' beliefs and those of
their clients); Philip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171, 174 (2007) (reasoning
that for someone to be held responsible, three conditions must be satisfied, that (1) they "faced a
morally significant choice"; (2) they "[were] in a position to see what was at stake"; and (3) "the
choice was truly up to [them]"); see also DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS:
ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 31 (2008) ("The duties ... impose[d] on
lawyers depend on the range of objectives that clients and their lawyers may jointly pursue and
the range of means that clients and their lawyers may use to pursue these objectives.").
20. Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 15 (1951); ef Charles
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend, the Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060, 1060 (1976) (stating that it is traditionally understood and accepted that lawyers are
"authorized, if not in fact required, to do some things ... for [their] client which [they] would not
do for [themselves]").
21. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RIGHTS 1,
3 (1975).
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near-total primacy to their clients' interests-without regard to their social
utility, without regard to the relative ability of those adversely affected to
protect themselves, without regard to the advocate's own personal beliefs or
human reactions" is "widely defended, although also strongly questioned. 22
Pronouncements by most bar associations and virtually every state's rules of
professional responsibility reflect this concept of partisanship and
nonaccountability at least in some form.
23
The traditional arguments in favor of lawyer nonaccountability focus on
certain core themes:
- The Rule of Law/Adversary System. The rule of law means that fair
procedures are established in advance and applied without regard to whether
the defendant is rich or poor, powerful or powerless, or a perceived enemy or
24friend. The adversary system is our chosen method to implement the law and
requires that each side have a vigorous advocate, with a neutral decision-maker
assessing the merits.
25
- Check on Government Power. The rule of law is particularly important as
a check on government power because, historically, unchecked power in the• • •26
name of righteousness led to significant abuses. History also demonstrates
that "[t]he more outrageous the alleged crime, the greater may be the state's
temptation to ignore rights, and so the greater the need for the defense lawyer's
22. HOWARD LESNICK, BEING A LAWYER: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN
THE PRACTICE OF LAW 4 (1992); see also Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't Just Be Hired
Guns, in ENRON CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 793, 797 (Nancy B. Rapoport
& Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (discussing why lawyers' responsibility cannot be limited to
compliance with rules, but must extend to self-regulated ethical conduct because of the inability
of any set of rules to capture the complexity of the ethical decision-making process).
23. This notion of nonaccountability is codified in what Bradley Wendel describes as the
'curious non-rule" of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.2(b). See W. Bradley
Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics: The Problem of Client
Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987, 999 & n.50 (2006) [hereinafter Wendel, Institutional and
Individual Justification] ("Finally, there is a curious non-rule, which does not impose an
obligation to represent but which nevertheless reminds lawyers that '[a] lawyer's representation
of a client ... does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or
moral views or activities."' (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2009))).
24. See infra Part II.B; see also Christopher L. Kutz, Just Disagreements Indeterminacy and
Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997, 999-1000 (1994) (discussing how, according
to the "liberal conception of public institutions, decisions about the exercise of public authority
should be made on the basis of publicly available rules and standards that are capable of
determining concrete outcomes"); Richard Wasserstorm, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 12 (1975) (noting justifications for why a criminal defendant should be
represented regardless of the merits of his case).
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See, e.g., Anant Raut, Why I Defend "Terrorists," SALON (Jan. 17, 2007),
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2007/0l/17/guantanamo (providing a historical
rationale for why Guantdnamo detainees deserve attorney representation).
[Vol. 60:275
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special knowledge., 27 This argument emphasizes that only by protecting the
guilty can lawyers ensure the protection of the innocent as well.
- First-Class Citizenship/Paternalism. Because the practice of law is so
complex, it is frequently inaccessible to the average person without guidance
from a lawyer.28 This is problematic because access to the legal system is
necessary for individuals to understand and exercise their full rights as
citizens. As gatekeepers to the law, lawyers must not appeal to their own
sense of right and wrong in deciding whom to represent because, in doing so,
they will deny individuals the ability to make their own moral decisions.
30
- Law as a Mediating Influence. The law acts as a mediating force between
opposing moral views in our pluralistic society.31 Lawyers facilitate this moral
conversation by assisting clients and should suspend their own personal moral
views in order to allow this dialogue to take place in the public forum.32
These arguments are all systematic in that they justify a lawyer's decision to
represent any client without regard for the client's goals, as long as the client
has a credible claim of legality. As a mere facilitator, the lawyer is not the
moral actor in this story, and the system takes care of the ethical
considerations.
The two most common justifications for the principle of partisanship, and
the corollary idea of nonaccountability, are reliance on the adversary system
and the idea that legal representation is required to implement the rule of law
in our society. 33 These justifications, however, provide only weak support for
both partisanship and nonaccountability in corporate, nonadversarial
representation.
B. The Adversarial Justification and Rule of Law
The most prominent justification for lawyers' pursuit of partisan activity is
embedded in the adversary system. 34 The phrase "adversary system" is
commonly used to describe the process by which a neutral decision-maker
applies the law and procedural rules and evaluates the facts and arguments
27. Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad Person?, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY OF
LEGAL ETHICs 131, 146 (1999).
28. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613, 617-18 (1986) [hereinafter Pepper, The
Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role].
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part I.D.
33. See Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification, supra note 23, at 991 (discussing
these justifications as a response to the question, "What sort of monstrous system is it... which
purports to generate moral permissions for acts that would be wrong if committed outside the
framework of the system?").
34. See MARKOVITS, supra note 19, at 32, 34.
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presented by zealous advocates of each side. 35 The notion that courts can, in
theory at least, present a level playing field is a cherished belief.a6 As long as
the case is not frivolous, the lawyer, as advocate, should not serve as judge of
the merits.3 7 Under the adversarial justification, "[i]t is particularly important
that it be made as easy as possible for a lawyer to take a case that other people
regard as bad," because "[i]n a way the practice of the law is like free speech.
It defends what we hate as well as what we most love."
38
The adversarial justification is at its strongest when all the institutional
preconditions are present: a neutral decision-maker, competent counsel for
each side, and adherence to the established procedural rules by all those
involved. 9 When the state is asserting its power against an individual or a
corporate entity, the adversarial justification takes on added significance
because it serves as a check against the potential abuse of governmental
power.4 0 This is an important manifestation of the American implementation
of the "rule of law." 41
Traditionally, some forms of lawyering are justified and defended simply by
referring to the system in which they take place; no reference to the content of
the work provided is generally necessary to defend the social value of such
42
work. The adversary system is a classic example because its systemic value
is readily presented even if society at large falters in its commitment to this
ideal. 43  For example, it is necessary and proper to represent a criminal
35. Brian C. Haussmann, Note, The ABA Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations:
Exceeding the Limits of the Adversarial Ethic, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1218, 1224-25 (2004).
36. See Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification, supra note 23, at 1000 ("One of
the institutional justifications for the legal system is that it safeguards the value of human dignity,
even for repugnant people, by requiring fair treatment according to impartial procedures of
adjudication.").
37. Wasserstorm, supra note 24, at 6, 9.
38. Curtis, supra note 7, at 14, 18. Curtis discusses the importance of this concept in the
context of those accused of being Communists in the 1950s needing lawyers to represent them,
noting that "people who [were] ... charged with being Communists, who heaven knows need[ed]
a lawyer, what with the capering of congressional committees, [found] it hard to get counsel." Id.
39. Haussmann, supra note 35, at 1224-25.
40. See Gillers, supra note 27, at 146 (discussing the role of a criminal defense lawyer to
"monitor[] the government while it pursues those it most eagerly wants to convict"); Wendel,
Institutional and Individual Justification, supra note 23, at 994-95 (calling the power of the state
in adversarial proceedings "hostile").
41. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX (noting that, in the end, we seek "a government
of laws and not of men").
42. See Gillers, supra note 27, at 146 (discussing the value of the legal system and noting
that the Constitution provides counsel for those who cannot afford such); see also Wendel,
Institutional and Individual Justification, supra note 23, at 990-91 (using a baseball analogy to
explain that criticism of a crucial facet of an institution is criticism of the institution as a whole,
not merely that one part).
43. See Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification, supra note 23, at 988
("The ... argument for withholding moral criticism of lawyers acting in a representative capacity
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defendant accused of a heinous crime.4 When Frank Armani and Frances
Belge represented serial killer Robert Garrow in upstate New York, they
suffered social ostracism and received death threats.4 Nevertheless, Armani
and Belge had a powerful justification for their decision to accept
representation of Garrow: the systemic value of representing the accused and
the requirement that the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.46 This
scheme, in turn, protects the freedoms of everyone. 47 It forces the government
48to thoroughly prove its case before taking away a citizen's liberty. Thus,
lawyers like Armani and Bele serve the common good by taking on this role
within the adversary system.
The adversarial justification for nonaccountability grows weaker when
applied outside the litigation context. For example, transactional work
between parties does not have a neutral arbiter, such as a judge, to determine
the final facts and equities of the parties. Instead, the parties largely "make"
the law that will apply to the transaction in the boardroom, merger discussions,
proxy fights, hostile takeovers, and a plethora of other venues where lawyers,
accountants, financial strategists, and public-relations professionals craft
strategy. 50 Yet many of those affected, including workers and communities, do
not have a seat at the table. It is true that this bargaining occurs in the "shadow
relies on reasons that are 'systemic' in the sense of deriving their force from the moral values
underlying the legal system.").
44. See Wasserstorm, supra note 24, at 9-10.
45. TOM ALIBRANDI WITH FRANK H. ARMANI, PRIVILEGED INFORMATION 128-34 (1984)
(describing the condemnation, harassment, and physical threats the lawyers received).
46. See Wasserstorm, supra note 24, at 9-10 (discussing the value of a trial and the
importance of the attorney's role within such).
47. See Olson & Katyal, supra note 4 ("The ethos of the bar is built on the idea that lawyers
will represent both the popular and the unpopular, so that everyone has access to justice.").
48. See Wasserstorm, supra note 24, at 12.
49. In such situations, the lawyer's choice to represent a client must be distinguished from
what should be done during that representation.
50. See Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of Contract: Beyond the Shadow of the Law,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 107, 109-12 (1995) (discussing the development of a contract in a
transactional setting and the role of the transactional corporate attorney). The world of
corporate-transactional law is largely governed by what can be negotiated between parties within
the broad boundary of contract law. See id.
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of the law," 51 but the core of this corporate-transaction lawyering involves
private ordering.52
Although the adversary system does not provide a systemic justification for
corporate representation, there are other theories more closely tailored to
transactional work. 53  These theories have not necessarily seeped into the
common vocabulary of lawyers, but it is still crucial to explore whether they
support a claim that transactional lawyers are not systematically accountable
for the goals of their clients.
C. The Autonomy and Citizenship Justifications
Another traditional justification for the lawyer's partisan role-and the
corollary that the lawyer is not responsible for the goals of the client-rests in
the claim that the lawyer is necessary for achieving first-class citizenship. 54 As
Professor Stephen Pepper has argued, the lawyer's amoral role promotes the
autonomy of the client and assists in implementing concepts of equality.
55
This argument is particularly strong with regard to the representation of the
powerless. 56 As David Luban has observed, the "people's lawyer" serves a
political role in addressing inequality.
57
Whatever force the first-class citizenship justification has regarding
representing individuals or those in positions of little power, it grows
significantly weaker in the context of representing entities, and even weaker
still concerning the representation of for-profit corporate actors engaged in
51. See id. at 108-09 (citing Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979)). The term "shadow of
the law" was first used by Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser to discuss private divorce
negotiations between parties and how they are influenced by the law. Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950, 968 (1979). The term is now used when referring to both litigation and transactional work.
Rubin, supra note 50, at 108-09 (using the "shadow of the law" concept when discussing contract
negotiations).
52. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 51, at 950 (defining "private ordering" as "law
that parties bring into assistance by agreement"); see also Rubin, supra note 50, at 109-12 (noting
that private agreements between parties largely determine the terms of contracts).
53. See infra Parts II.C-D.
54. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role, supra note 28, at 617.
55. See id. at 617-18; see also Fried, supra note 20, at 1073 (noting the importance of the
attorney in the adversary context because, without him, "the law would impose constraints on the
lay citizen"). But see David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 638-39 (1986) (hereinafter Luban, The Lysistratian
Prerogative] (disagreeing with Stephen Pepper's belief that the role of a lawyer is amoral and that
individual autonomy is preferable to good conduct).
56. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 240 (advocating "legal services for
the poor" and discussing equal access to these services).
57. 1d; see also GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 5-7 (1992) (describing examples of the "political vision and
sensibility" of such "people's lawyers" who work hard to "fundamentally redefine activist law
practice as a central aspect of their efforts to change the world").
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forward-looking conduct. Autonomy in the first-class citizenship model
requires an autonomous actor, that is, a moral, decision-making agent.
Corporations are citizens under the Due Process clause, but it is less clear
whether corporations are moral agents.58 Milton Friedman's view has largely
prevailed in modem corporate law-that the obligation of a corporation is to
maximize profits to shareholders while not violating the positive law. 59 The
role of corporate agents is likewise limited by their need to serve the interests
of shareholders. At best, under U.S. corporate law, the corporation is
decidedly amoral, encouraging profit maximization over other values. As
Professor Kent Greenfield has observed, "[cjorporations have broad powers,
but only a limited role.., to make money." 6  Delaware corporate law, which
governs the majority of publicly traded corporations, makes
profit-maximization the dominant goal of corporations. 6 1 There is a strong
claim that other interests impacted by corporate action are systematically62
minimized under Delaware corporate law. For example, when a corporate
decision will have an extraordinary impact on shareholder rights, such as the
sale of a corporation, courts will afford the directors' decisions enhanced
scrutiny to assure that the shareholders receive the "best value reasonably
available." 63 In effect, this legal doctrine makes significant effects on non-
represented stakeholders largely irrelevant.64 From the perspective of moral
58. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889). The Supreme
Court has justified calling a corporation a "person" because it conceptualized corporations as
"merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose." Pembina Consol. Silver Mining
& Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888). The ensuing 120 years of corporate
law, however, have demonstrated that a corporation functions in a more complex fashion than a
mere association of individuals. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To Be or Not to Be? Citizens United and
the Corporate Form 1-2 (U. Mich. L. Sch. Empirical Legal Stud. Ctr., Working Paper No. 4,
2010), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle=l Il16&context-um
ichlwps.
59. Friedman, supra note 13, at 126; see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law:
The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 42 (2004)
(discussing Friedman's view as the dominant approach in corporate law).
60. Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, I HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 87, 87
(2005).
61. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 2-3, 107-09 (2006); see William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 669 (1974) (discussing
Delaware's favorable treatment of corporations).
62. GREENFIELD, supra note 61, at 16.
63. Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 37 (Del. 1994); see also
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) (discussing
that when a corporate bidding contest results in protecting directors from liability, the directors'
action cannot withstand "enhanced scrutiny"); Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of
Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103, 104 (2003) ("Although the
social impact of takeovers can be dramatic, the consequences for non-shareholder constituencies
are arguably beside the point.").
64. See Paramount Commc 'ns Inc., 637 A.2d at 44; Paredes, supra note 63, at 104.
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analysis, this outcome is quite startling. Delaware corporate law is effectively
stating that corporate officers should not consider the full impact of their
conduct. At this point the first-class citizenship justification for client
preference and the corollary claim that the lawyer is not accountable for the
acts of the client collapse. A non-moral agent compelled by law to engage in
decidedly amoral, and on occasion possibly immoral, conduct cannot claim a
theoretical right to autonomy. 65 Nor can that non-moral agent claim a right to
a lawyer's service to achieve an amoral, if not immoral, end.66 And, whatever
definition of morality is used, to expressly exclude the consequences of one's
conduct from the analysis is an impoverished moral analysis.
Friedman bluntly questions whether a fictional entity can be subject to moral
reasoning: "What does it mean to say that 'business' has responsibilities?
Only people can have responsibilities. A corporation is an artificial person and
in this sense may have artificial responsibilities, but 'business' as a whole
cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in this vague sense.' 67 Friedman
recognized the tension between maximizing shareholder value and managerial
discretion (the "agency problem"), which may allow the individual manager to
work for the benefit of other constituencies. Despite the potential social
benefits that may accrue when a manager acts to favor other constituencies,
such as corporate employees or the general community, from the corporate
shareholder perspective,
the corporate executive would be spending someone else's money
for a general social interest. Insofar as his actions in accord with his
"'social responsibility"' reduce returns to stockholders, he is
spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise the price to
customers, he is spending the customers' money. Insofar as his
actions lower the wages of some employes [sic], he is spending their
69
money.
65. Cf Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589,
590 (1985) ("In a substantial amount of legal practice, 'the client' is not the 'person with a
problem' traditionally depicted in legal literature, but an organization with indeterminate or
potentially conflicting interests. So too, the attorney often is not an independent oral agent but an
employee with circumscribed responsibility, organizational loyalty, and attenuated client
contact."). For example, Bill Gates deserves autonomy in part because he can decide to earn
income and distribute his wealth as he chooses. Microsoft, however, lacks the ability to freely
distribute corporate assets. Those assets belong to its shareholders after all, not the corporation.
Thus, Microsoft, like all corporate entities, is not capable of the full range of actions necessary to
be termed an autonomous actor.
66. See id at 603 (noting that formalist theories of professional responsibility and ethics
decried "impartial application" of the law as resulting in immoral judgments and negatively
viewed lawyers who promoted such results).
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The corporate social-responsibility movement has emerged in opposition to
this shareholder-wealth model, urging that corporations have a moral duty to
consider the consequences of their conduct beyond profit-maximization and
the express limits of the law.70 The corporate social-responsibility movement
attempts to put the obligation on "the corporation," providing managers who
make decisions for the corporation with a legitimate basis to consider factors
other than shareholder wealth. 71 Although this movement is a laudable
endeavor, it has not had significant success in reconceptualizing corporate
duties. 72 If the standard conception of profit maximization and the
corresponding minimization of corporate moral responsibility prevail, then a
first-class citizenship model cannot provide lawyers with a strong justification
for nonaccountability.
Despite the continued predominance of shareholder interests under Delaware
corporate laws,73 many, perhaps all, of the corporate mergers and activities
under those laws are in fact morally defensible to varying degrees. For
example, corporate work may benefit the economy and increase efficiency,
bring new products to the market, or create jobs.74 Thus, in many cases, the
standard corporate legal work advances the common good.
70. See Richard P. Nielsen, Organization Theory and Ethics: Varieties and Dynamics of
Constrained Optimization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION THEORY: META-
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 476, § 17.6.1, at 494 (Haridimos Tsoukas & Christian Knudsen
eds., 2003) ("From a postmodern perspective, investor capitalism with its primary and optimizing
concern for the shareholder wealth criterion for the most part ignores the legitimate needs of
multiplicity and diversity of groups and their interests in the service of optimizing the need
satisfaction of one priority group, shareholders."). Rebecca DeWinter lauds the social
responsibility movement for calling attention to various corporate practices in the apparel
industry that may otherwise have gone unrecognized. Rebecca DeWinter, The Anti-Sweatshop
Movement: Constructing Corporate Moral Agency in the Global Apparel Industry, in CAN
INSTITUTIONS HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES? COLLECTIVE MORAL AGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, 138, 139-40 (Toni Erskine ed., 2003). She constructs corporate moral agency as a
relational concept in which there is no "preexisting-template" with which to define the rights and
responsibilities ascribed to corporate actors. Id. Using the corporate social-responsibility
movement, she presents a strong argument that the corporation's identity as a moral agent is
socially and historically constructed. Id Philosopher Philip Pettit has also argued that
incorporated groups can have collective responsibility. Pettit, supra note 19, at 171-72.
71. See Nielsen, supra note 70, §17.6.1, at 994-95. Organizational theorist Richard P.
Nielsen notes that although the "modernist, managerial capitalist perspective" recognized the
needs of multiple groups rather than solely those of the shareholders, the postmodern perspective
is creating the "postmodern multiplicity perspective" in which multiple groups feel justified in
purposefully avoiding supporting corporations. Id.
72. See David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 253, 255 (2009) (stating that "shareholder primacy" models still dominate in the field of
corporate law, and "consumer interest has been left relatively unexamined").
73. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
74. Thomas W. Ogletree, Corporate Capitalism and the Common Good: A Framework for
Addressing the Challenges of a Global Economy, 30 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 79, 81-82 (2002).
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Given the potential positive externalities of corporate activity, corporate
lawyers will often be able to defend their choice of clients. Lawyers should
not hesitate to question whether their actions on behalf of clients conform to
socially beneficial conduct. Attorneys, after all, are trained to make arguments
and should be well able to advance a persuasive and credible justification for
their participation in a corporate matter. It is possible to defend even
unpopular corporate legal work, such as the representation of a tobacco
company. Although tobacco products are known to have detrimental health
effects, the market and theories of individual autonomy and liberty suggest that
consumers should be allowed to make their own choices, even if such choices
result in harm. 75 Of course, the habit-forming nature of cigarettes complicates
the discussion, as do concerns that information about the physical effects of
76
cigarettes may not be widely disseminated, especially in third-world markets.
A lawyer explaining the value of distributing cigarettes would need to address
these concerns.
Of course, some corporate actions, such as those in the cigarette example,
will be more difficult to defend as socially beneficial. This discussion,
however, serves to focus the discussion on the real issue: whether the client's
goals-and the lawyer's work on behalf of the client-advance the common
good. If not, the client may still be represented, though the lawyer engaged in
the representation should not receive the same moral credit through the concept
of nonaccountability as a lawyer whose work arguably does promote the
common good.
Therefore, lawyers who work for clients that do not advance social good
should pause to think about their roles in those representations and the
representations' repercussions on both the lawyers' own morals and the morals
of the legal profession in general. In such a representation, outsiders would
likely, and unsurprisingly, conclude that the lawyer is motivated primarily by
money and not a higher cause, such as promoting first-class citizenship.
Additionally, the legal community should not weaken its moral responsibility
by asserting that lawyers are never accountable for the goals of their clients,
just as the business community would never claim that the chief executive
officer of a cigarette company is not accountable for his or her actions on
behalf of his company.
75. See Harel Arnon, Legal Reasoning: Justifying Tolerance in the US. Supreme Court, 2
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 262, 270-71 (2007) ("[W]e must allow people to make their own
choices, even when they make bad ones."). But see Kevin F. Ryan, Lex Et Ratio: The Spirit of
Liberty, 28 VT. B.J. 5, 5 (2002) ("Liberty certainly entails the freedom to do wrong, but those
who use their liberty for bad ends have misused a gift and may deserve to forfeit that gift.").
76. See ROB CUNNINGHAM, SMOKE & MIRRORS: THE CANADIAN TOBACCO WAR 210-12
(1996).
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D. Law as a Mediating Institution for Moral Conflict
A more recent, overarching theory of the morality of the lawyer's role has
been advocated by Professor W. Bradley Wendel, who places law squarely at
the center of moral debate. 77 Wendel argues that, in the American pluralistic
society in which there are contested visions of what constitutes moral behavior,
the law functions as a mediator of differences. 78 As a result, lawycrs should
take a law-respecting, and even a law-deferring attitude, toward moral issues
when serving in their representative capacities. 79 Lawyers need not agree with
the moral views of their clients because, as lawyers, they are facilitating the
moral conversation in the legal and public arena when they assist their clients,
and this conversation is a critical step in moral discernment.
80
Wendel's theory offers an overarching vision of the lawyer's role, and works
well in areas in which the law plays an active role in discerning particular
moral questions. 81 The American legal system currently grapples with the
moral underpinnings of a plethora of issues, such as abortion, assisted suicide,
and gun control.82 Many other matters of our political life, such as
protection of civil rights, the use of affirmative action, the regulation
of immigration, the death penalty, the procedures governing military
tribunals and detainee interrogations, and the propriety of the estate
tax are all properly understood as issues that call us to think about
the proper relationship between law and morality as well.
83
As Stephen Gillers has argued, "[W]hen lawyers act within the
rights-adjudicating apparatus ... , its cloak of legitimacy should insulate them
against charges of immorality based on a client's ends."
8 4
77. Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification, supra note 23, at 987-93 (discussing
the restraints that moral reasoning implies in relation to an attorney's ability to select clients).
78. See W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 364-65 (2004)
[hereinafter Wendel, Civil Obedience]; Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification, supra
note 23, at 988; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 89 (2005); W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1167, 1168-69 (2005).
79. See Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 78, at 382 (discussing the "obligation and
respect [lawyers] owe to the law").
80. See id. at 384 ("[Lawyers] act in the name of society by providing a mechanism through
which normative disagreements are channelled into an authoritative process of resolution.").
81. See id at 382-88; see also Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225, 258-59 (2006) (discussing Wendel's "theory of lawyering").
82. See Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 78, at 380.
83. Gregory A. Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S.
Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 2
(2006).
84. Gillers, supra note 27, at 147. Gillers establishes three additional justifications that
"strengthen the argument for granting lawyers immunity from moral criticism for their clients'
goals": (1) litigation is a form of public education that provides an incidental benefit; (2) litigation
may uncover "new facts[] or new contexts" that "can change [the] assessment of the moral
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The challenge is that the law might not intervene, despite the differing
visions of morality.85 But this does not end the moral discussion. Law may
indeed be the superior arena for resolving the political question of whether the
law should intervene, but few are willing to make the law itself the ultimate
arbiter of moral decision-making. 86 To require the law to decide contested
moral questions, in addition to the political question of the propriety of its
intervention into the area of morality asks far too much of the legal system.
87
The theory of law as a mediator of moral differences appears thinnest in
those areas in which the law has expressly deferred to the private arena, as it
does in corporate-transactional lawyering. With few exceptions, corporations
have broad freedom to buy, sell, and split off assets, and to create new areas of
business.88 These actions are not part of a "rights-adjudicating apparatus," but
rather a private ordering apparatus.89 Professor Rebecca DeWinter links the
emergence of the corporate-accountability movement in the 1970s to the
retreat of law, caused by the shrinking of the welfare state, deregulation and
privatization, and the expansion of trade and investment, among other trends.
9 °
The legal vacuum created by these trends has been filled with a moral
conversation that considers whether particular corporate acts advance the
common good.91 Much of this conversation occurs through public-relations
initiatives that expose problems, such as the unfair, but not illegal, treatment of
an employee or predatory, but legal, lending practices. 92 After the problem is
exposed, the community members can have a conversation about facts
(perhaps the employee was let go for other reasons or the loan rate does not
justify a label of "predatory") and about values related to the problems. (Why
should a company give an employee a break? Why should a company not take
advantage of a legal maneuver that causes harm to third persons?) At this
issues"; and (3) litigation may discover or disclose "new or overlooked moral insights." Id. at
148.
85. Cf Yogesh K. Tyagi, The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, 16 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 883, 889 (1995) (discussing how nations should evaluate whether a situation requires
humanitarian or moral intervention by looking first to the normal state behavior and then to other
principles).
86. See Ryan E. Mick, Justifications for a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Deference to the
States' Moral Judgements, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 379, 401-02 (2003).
87. Id.
88. See Owens Coming v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 257 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2001)
(stating that, as long as corporations abide by public policy and relevant corporate law, they can
be very flexible in establishing their procedures).
89. See Gillers, supra note 27, at 149 (discussing the rights-adjudicating apparatus);
Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 51, at 950 & n.I (discussing the meaning of "private
ordering"). Because these actions are in a private-ordering apparatus, "the lawyer is as morally
vulnerable as any agent who provides a skill or product essential to the client's purpose." Gillers,
supra note 27, at 149.
90. DeWinter, supra note 70, at 141.
91. See id. at 141-42.
92. See id. at 142.
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point, the discussion directly addresses the rightness or wrongness of the
corporate conduct. The business people who make these decisions are
challenged with moral arguments that warrant a response. A recent example of
this dynamic is illustrated when the leaders of major banks appeared before
Congress to defend their bonuses despite receiving taxpayer bailout money in
the previous year.
93
The business decision-makers might attempt to justify their actions by
claiming that they must pursue profits by any means that are legal. Of course,
the argument against these decision-makers is that they are doing wrong as
human beings, though their actions may be legally acceptable. A thoughtful
business-actor might present the idea that serving as a corporate agent is
always a social good and therefore he is not personally responsible for what he
does in that representative capacity. This essentially amounts to claiming
nonaccountability for corporate agents. However, because corporations can
only act through their agents, this logic leads perilously close to a claim that
corporations should be exempt from moral criticism. Another rationale of this
nonaccountability claim is that the free market is a superior venue in which to
resolve moral differences. But, as has been long understood, the market is
capable of harshly immoral acts-slavery as a prime example-and is not
exempt from questions of rightness and wrongness. 94 Although the market is
capable of promoting the common good, just as people are, it is also capable of
doing great harm.
Therefore, these arguments that business persons advance to justify their
nonaccountability do not prevail. It makes little sense, then, that lawyers of
these corporations should be able to claim nonaccountability, particularly when
the legal system is no longer acting as a moral mediator. Accordingly, because
the legal system defers much decision-making power to the private parties in
corporate transactions, the idea that nonaccountability is justified because the
law is acting as a mediating influence that will solve moral debates fails, just as
the other traditional justifications for nonaccountability failed when applied to
corporate transactions.
95
93. See Bankers Defend Actions to Congress, CBSNEwS.COM (Jan. 13, 2010, 2:00 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/13/business/main6091377.shtml.
94. For a modem example, see John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937, 939 (9th
Cir. 2002), vacated, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) in which Myanmar villagers sued the defendant
corporation under the Alien Tort Claims Act for aiding and abetting alleged human-rights
violations including forced labor, murder, rape, and torture, in connection with the corporation's
construction of a gas pipeline through the Myanmar region.
95. See W. William Hodes, Accepting and Rejecting Clients-The Moral Autonomy of the
Second-to-the-Last Lawyer in Town, 48 KAN. L. REv. 977, 979 (2000) (presenting an analysis of
a lawyer's concern over his client's representation).
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II. WHY LAWYERS' CONDUCT Is NOT CONSISTENT WITH
NONACCOUNTABILITY
As Monroe Freedman has urged, law6ers have a moral obligation to justify
the reasons they represent their clients. Thoughtful lawyers responding to a
criticism of their corporate representation might point to the inspiring tenet that
everyone should have access to legal service. Although this is true, the
question is whether the lawyer is responsible for whom he or she chooses as
clients. The legal profession's assertion of nonaccountability regarding an
attorney's choice of client is often inconsistent with the lawyer's own conduct.
A. Lawyers Have the Freedom to Choose Clients
The principle of nonaccountability enables the lawyer codes of professional
conduct to urge lawyers to make legal representation broadly available,
including to unpopular clients and causes. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code) urges that lawyers "should not lightly decline
proffered employment" because it is the "objective of the bar to make legal
services fully available." 97 The Model Code also exhorts that "[t]he fulfillment
of this objective requires acceptance by a lawyer of his share of tendered
employment which may be unattractive both to him and the bar generally."
9
Although the legal codes appear to "talk the talk" about giving
representation to all, they do not fully "walk the walk." As David Luban notes,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, although establishing a strong partisanship model, are rife with
escape hatches for situations in which a lawyer may not feel morally
96. Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 TEX. L. REV.
111, 111-12(1995).
97. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26 (1983).
98. Id. Drawing on an implicit model of the honorable lawyer supporting the downtrodden,
the Model Code provides noble imagery: "History is replete with instances of distinguished and
sacrificial services by lawyers who have represented unpopular clients and causes. Regardless of
his personal feelings, a lawyer should not decline representation because a client or a cause is
unpopular or community reaction is adverse." Id. at EC 2-27. The Model Code recognized the
danger that this conceptualization, coupled with the principle of zealous advocacy and
nonaccountability, could lead to a conclusion that lawyers must always speak the words that will
be in the client's best interests. Therefore, the Model Code envisioned limits: "The obligation of
loyalty . . . implies no obligation to adopt a personal viewpoint favorable to the interests or
desires of his client. While a lawyer must act always with circumspection in order that his
conduct will not adversely affect the rights of a client in a matter he is then handling, he may take
positions on public issues and espouse legal reforms he favors without regard to the individual
views of any client." Id. at EC 7-17. The language of this passage does not require a lawyer to
set aside his personal feelings only in instances when he represents "the defenseless or the
oppressed," but the notes to the 1980 Model Code indicate that some states envision this as
applying in those circumstances. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-27 n.45
(1980).
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comfortable asserting a particular position of the client.99 First, the law and
ethics codes recognize that "[l]awyers have considerable freedom to reject
cases," which allows them "to limit their representation so as to exclude
repugnant objectives or tactics." 100 The 1908 American Bar Association
Canons of Professional Ethics strongly embraced complete freedom to choose
clients:
No lawyer is obliged to act either as advisor or advocate for every
person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to
decline employment. Every lawyer upon his own responsibility must
decide what business he will accept as counsel, what causes he will
bring into Court for plaintiffs, what cases he will contest in Court for
defendants. The responsibility for advising questionable
transactions, for bringing questionable suits, for urging questionable
defenses, is the lawyer's responsibility. He cannot escape it by




Once representation is undertaken, however, the obligations are clear: "[t]he
lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability."' 2
By 1969, the organized bar association was willing to assert a duty to "not
lightly decline proffered employment," and the Model Code urged that every
lawyer "should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged." 10 3 The
1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) originally urged that
lawyers "should render public interest legal service."' 0  This provision was
eventually replaced by a more detailed statement that "[a] lawyer should aspire
to render at least (50) hours of pro bono public legal services per year."' 10 5
99. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 17, app. 1, at 393-97; see also David
Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to
Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1007 (1990) (asserting that it is a common
understanding that the legal codes "embody the standard conception [of legal ethics], albeit in a
diffident and bleached-out form containing some significant bows to the moral activist vision").
But see Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
116, 121 (1990) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988))
(stating that lawyers do not always act consistently with Luban's standard conception of legal
ethics).
100. Ellmann, supra note 99, at 121.
101. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 31 (1908).
102. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25, 2-26 (1983); see also id. at EC 8-3
("Those persons unable to pay for legal services should be provided needed services."); id. at EC
8-9 (stating that "lawyers should encourage, and should aid in making, needed changes and
improvements" to the legal system).
104. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1984).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2009).
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Although the focus of the rule is on representing the disadvantaged, the
accompanying comments leave lawyers with broad discretion in choosing the
recipient of their pro bono services. l06 Similarly, except in instances of
court-appointed counsel, courts are quite reluctant to force a lawyer to take a
particular client.' ° 7 The bottom line is that lawyers have a wide range of
choice when deciding who to represent.
10 8
There appear to be five common reasons that lawyers choose clients: (1) a
desire to obtain legal fees; (2) an agreement with the goals of the client; (3) an
agreement that the representation promotes the rule of law; (4) prestige;
and (5) a representation undertaken as a favor to another person. It is safe to
say that most lawyers choose clients in part because the client can pay.'0 9 As
Professor Howard Lesnick noted, "[g]oing where the money is is deemed to be
a neutral choice; placing any other consideration on the scales bears a burden,
sometimes a significant burden, of explanation and justification."' 10 The legal
profession spends a great deal of intellectual energy asking the important
question of whether lawyers should have complete freedom to choose clients;
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. I ("Services can be performed in civil
matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to
provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases.").
107. See Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 1039. Particular
circumstances may raise a question of whether an attorney-client relationship exists, but if a
lawyer clearly articulates his or her intent not to represent a prospective client, courts are unlikely
to undermine that decision. In finding attorney-client relationships, courts generally use a
contract model. Additionally, a lawyer arguably has an obligation to respond promptly to a
request for legal assistance. Consider the case of the Massachusetts lawyer who received a letter
from a prospective client requesting legal assistance on a possible tort claim. See DeVaux v. Am.
Home Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d 355 (1983). The lawyer had previously represented this client
on a domestic relations matter, but, according to the court, that "d[id] not create an attorney-client
relationship as to other affairs of the client." Id. at 357 & n.6. The lawyer's secretary misfiled
the letter and the attorney did not discover it until after the statute of limitations had run. Id. at
357. Additionally, the lawyer failed to return several phone calls from the prospective client. Id.
The court found that an issue of fact existed as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed
that precluded summary judgment in favor of the attorney in a subsequent legal-malpractice
action. Id. at 358-59.
108. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 84 (5th ed. 1907) ("It
by no means follows ... as a principle of private action for the advocate, that all causes are to be
taken by him indiscriminately, and conducted with a view to one single end, success.").
109. The fact of attorneys receiving payment or fees has been a nettlesome issue since the
early colonial days, when several colonies initially prohibited attorneys from accepting fees in
court or regulating the amount of fees an attorney could receive. See PETER CHARLES HOFFER,
LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 41-42 (1992) (discussing attorney's fees as viewed by
the colonies). Commentators have also noted the link between zeal and payment. As Professor
Deborah Rhode observed, "most lawyers will prefer to leave no stone unturned, provided, of
course, they can charge by the stone." Rhode, supra note 65, at 635.
110. LESNICK, supra note 22, at 32; Fried, supra note 20, at 1075 ("It is undeniable that
money is usually what cements the lawyer-client relationship. But the content of the relation is
determined by the client's needs, just as friendship is a response to another's needs.").
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yet the reality that money, rather than timing or the nature of the cause, is the
dominant basis for client selection is largely ignored.
One cannot help but posit that if lawyers truly believed in the first-class
citizenship model they would guarantee representation to all clients regardless
of ability to pay, creating a kind of universal legal service system. The fact is,
only wealthy clients are first-class citizens under Pepper's model."]l If lawyers
are not morally accountable for the clients whom they choose to represent, it
should not be surprising that many lawyers will choose those clients who are
able to pay, without regard to the moral value of the clients' goals."
2
The argument becomes complicated when money is a factor because money
is often assumed to be the primary motive for action. Society tends to impute
rationality to economic decisions. One is more likely to believe criminal
defense counsel, making a minimal income as public defenders, who say they
do the work because they believe in the importance of giving the poor an
opportunity to have a vigorous defense, than lawyers who make the same claim
while earning millions of dollars representing organized crime figures or large
corporations. As David Wilkins notes, the former lawyer is referred to as a
"freedom fighter," and the latter as a "mercenary."
' 13
Although motive is important in moral reasoning, the underlying actions also
require scrutiny. As to these underlying actions, it should be acknowledged
that there are a variety of justifications for the moral and social value of
lawyers' work.' 4 This does not mean that litigators are somehow superior to
transactional lawyers in the perceived moral hierarchy; it does mean that the
justifications for legal work will not be the same. With litigators, the
arguments are weighted toward the procedural aspect of the legal
system-access to lawyers in the litigation process is generally of value
regardless of the individual's cause. With transactional lawyers, the
justification is more likely to be substantive. 16 Further, this discussion is not
to imply that the lawyer should not take work because of its lack of redeeming
social value. Many individuals in society spend their entire careers doing work
that produces neither an easily identifiable moral good nor moral evil.
However, there should be less social prestige in this work because the driving
force will be some form of self interest just as there is less prestige in being an
11. See Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role, supra note 28, at 617-19.
112. See Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative, supra note 55, at 643-45.
113. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 1056-58 (showing
that, despite there being no real difference between a lawyer working for a fee and without a fee,
there is a different public conception of the lawyer's intentions in each of these scenarios).
114. See Karen L. Loewy, Lawyering for Social Change, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1869,
1872-74 (2000) (stating that lawyers have a special, broad role in society to promote democracy
and protect societal values).
115. See, e.g., Wasserstorm, supra note 24, at 9-11 (describing the importance of attorney
representation during the litigation procedure); see also supra Part II.B.
116. See supra Part II.B.
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executive for a socially irresponsible company versus a socially responsible
company.
B. Choosing Clients and Cause Lawyering
Not only does the legal profession provide lawyers with wide freedom to
choose clients, but many lawyers also choose to work in areas in which they
are likely to agree with the goals of their client, or at least not disagree. 117
Sociologists refer to the situation when a lawyer chooses a client because of
the lawyer's personal alignment with the client's goals as "cause lawyering."' 18
Obviously not all lawyers choose clients in this way, but consanguinity with
the client plays a role in many decisions to take on a representation. 119
Professor Peter Margulies distinguishes between positional solidarity, which
"evokes the lawyer's commitment to a client's political, social or economic
goals," and operational solidarity, which "locates the lawyer as enabler of the
client's ongoing activities." 120 Lawyers who choose to embrace both
positional and operational solidarity with the client's goals must be mindful of
and conform their actions to their professional and ethical obligations.
121
Cause lawyers are "committed to using their professional work as a vehicle
to build [a] good society," often in various substantive areas of law.122 Some
lawyers, motivated by a distrust of the government's power or their interest in
the ostracized, choose to represent individuals against state power or to
117. Ellmann, supra note 99, at 125-26 ("[L]awyers may in fact agree rather often with their
clients' choice of objectives, and this agreement may reflect that lawyers do not maintain the
detachment from their clients' goals that complete nonaccountability might support."); Robert L.
Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships
in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 534-36 & tbl.5 (1985) (showing that, in a study of
lawyers in large law firms, 91.9% of those who had never turned down a case stated that they had
never been asked to undertake a case that conflicted with their personal values). Both David
Luban and Stephen Ellmanm discuss the concept of "cognitive dissonance" in which the lawyer
embraces the values of the client. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 402-03;
Ellman, supra note 99, at 128.
118. See, e.g., Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, State Transformation, Globalization, and
the Possibilities of Cause Lawyering: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN
A GLOBAL ERA 12-13 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001) ("[Clause lawyers choose
clients and cases in order to pursue their own ideological and redistributive projects . . . as a
matter of personal engagement.").
119. See id. (discussing the differences between cause lawyering and conventional
lawyering).
120. Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers
for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173, 174 (2003). Professor Margulies
also discussed "affective solidarity," a concept that "encompasses the bonds of empathy and trust
in the attorney-client relationship." Id.
121. Id. at 174-75.
122. Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyering for a Cause and Experiences from Abroad, 94 CALIF.
L. REv. 575, 577 (2006).
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advocate for socially unpopular causes. 123 The late William Kunstler was a
well-known "[1]awyer for [s]ocial [o]utcasts," whose personality was so
closely identified with his causes that his "wild hair seemed to symbolize his
distrust of government and his kinship with unpopular people and causes."'
' 24
"My purpose," he was reported to have said, "is to keep the state from
becoming all-domineering, all powerful."'
' 25
Similar to cause lawyering, many lawyers choose to specialize in certain
types of industry.' 26 For example, a lawyer might only represent banks or only
technology companies. 127 As a result, these lawyers, like cause lawyers, can
become experts on a particular industry and, thus, become better able to
understand the mindset of their clients.1
28
Canon 15 of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that a
lawyer should not assert "personal belief in his client's innocence or in the
justice of his cause, ' 29 sits in uneasy tension with cause lawyering. As
Charles Curtis noted,
here is a canon which calls improper something which the most
proper lawyers do. I suggest that its only purpose is to relieve
lawyers of the necessity of expressing their opinion, so that they may
never need express it unless they want to express it, and keep it to
themselves whenever they choose. The canon gives a lawyer an
excuse when his client wants him to espouse his cause, when all the
lawyer wants to take is a case.130
Similarly, the Model Rules and Model Code continue to regulate the
insertion of an attorney's opinion into a case.131
123. See, e.g., David Stout, William Kuntsler, 76, Dies; Lavnyer for Social Outcasts, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1995, at B6 (discussing Kuntsler's representation of unpopular causes and
individuals).
124. Id. ("[Kuntsler's] clients' unpopularity seemed to inspire Mr. Kuntsler, who was
recognized by admirers and detractors alike as a lawyer who embraced pariahs. He seemed to
seek out the most loathed of people and causes.").
125. Id.
126. See Lauren Nicole Morgan, Note, Finding Their Niche: Advance Conflicts Waivers
Facilitate Industry-Based Lawyering, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 963, 976 (2008) (discussing
"industry lawyers" and their roles).
127. See id. ("A lawyer may choose to specialize in any number of industries, such as
gaming, nuclear power, mining, education or the airline industry.").
128. See id (noting that a primary perk to specializing is that a lawyer "can know the
business, know the players, [and] understand the strategy of the client").
129. CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 15 (1908).
130. Curtis, supra note 7, at 15.
131. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2009) ("A lawyer shall not: . . . in
trial, . . . state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused .... "); MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C)(4) (1983) (same); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-24 ("The expression by a lawyer of his personal opinion as to the justness
2011]
Catholic University Law Review
Public models, such as Clarence Darrow, reinforce the power of choice.
Darrow developed his legal skills as a railroad lawyer before he chose to
represent labor organizers and criminal defendants.132 Because lawyers have
the freedom to embrace the goals of the client, and many lawyers do, the
confusion of non-lawyers with regard to lawyers' claim of nonresponsibility
for the choice of their clients and the clients' goals is understandable. For
example, if a lawyer chooses not to represent a pro-choice organization
because of the organization's beliefs, then it would suggest that the beliefs of
the lawyer's pro-life clients are less objectionable to the lawyer.1 33 As David
Wilkins notes, lawyers have "a moral right to control his or her own labor,"
which inexorably leads to the conclusion that the decision to accept a case
"carries moral significance."' 134
It is also unworkable to completely separate lawyers from their clients.
Cause lawyers would likely categorically reject a claim that they are not
accountable for the goals of their clients; in fact, they embrace those goals. A
lawyer who chooses to work for a public cause or in the public realm, rather
than for a large firm, will sacrifice much in terms of material reward. For
example, lawyers who become prosecutors typically does so because they
believe in the importance of bringing public order and justice to victims of
crimes. Similarly, lawyers who become public defenders typically do so
because of their belief that individuals are entitled to protections against the
harsh actions of the state. Lawyers make these choices because they believe in
a case, whether it be client-specific or systemic. Thus, the assertion that
lawyers are not accountable for their clients' goals diminishes the sacrifice that
some lawyers have made.
An additional dimension complicates the idea that lawyers are not morally
responsible for the goals of their clients, or, derivatively, for their choice of
clients. Typically, there is high praise of the lawyers who make monetary
of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the
guilt or innocence of an accused is not a proper subject for argument to the trier of fact.").
132. CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 57, 74-76 (1932).
133. In the American pluralistic society, experience suggests that "for every lawyer whose
conscience may be pricked" by representing a distasteful client, "there is another whose virtue is
tickled." Curtis, supra note 7, at 16, Charles Curtis's article on The Ethics of Advocacy stirred
much controversy-among other topics, he argued that lawyers should sometimes lie for their
clients. Id. at 7-9.
134. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 1039-40; see Fried,
supra note 20, at 1077-78 ("The lawyer's liberty-moral liberty-to take up what kind of
practice he chooses and to take up or decline what clients he will [represent] is an aspect of the
moral liberty of self to enter into personal relations freely."); Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1988) (describing how lawyers have full
discretion with regard to the clients and causes they represent); William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1128 (1988) (stating that a lawyer has "a
fundamental right to control [his] labor"); see also 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND SOCIAL POLICY 607-09 (Michael Coulter et al. eds., 2007)
(discussing the general rights of workers under Catholic social thought).
[Vol. 60:275
The Moral Responsibility of the Corporate Lawyer
sacrifices to serve the common good by taking a "public interest job," such as
becoming a public defender or legal-aid lawyer. This monetary sacrifice may
be particularly potent for young lawyers who serve, for example, as
prosecutors to pursue what they believe is the common good. Law schools and
bar associations give awards to those who work in the public interest and
praise lawyers who undertake pro bono work.135 Many law firms encourage
their associates to perform pro bono legal services. Those firms, in turn,
promote their pro bono services as evidence of the good work they have
done 136 in order to garner respect in the legal community. 137 The implicit
suggestion is that lawyers who choose to give up big salaries in exchange for
devoting their efforts to a cause in which they believe deserve at least as much
respect as lawyers who garner large salaries working primarily for their own
financial gain, typically on behalf of corporate clients.' 38 This does not mean
that corporate-transactional lawyers do not deserve respect in the legal
community. But, unlike lawyers who go to work for legal aid,
corporate-transactional lawyers must explain the value of their work in
different terms. They will need to refer to the accomplishments of the work,
and not merely the system in which the work occurs.
135. See, e.g., 2009 Kaufman Pro Bono Service Award, HARVARD LAW SCH.,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/clinical/news/2009-pro-bono-award.html (last visited Jan.
19, 2011) (announcing the winners of the 2009 Andrew L. Kaufman Pro Bono Service Award
from Harvard Law School); ABA Pro Bono Publico Award- Current Recipients, ABA,
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/pbpcurrent-recipients.html (last updated Aug. 18,
2010) (describing the ABA Pro Bono Publico Award and listing the 2010 recipients); Dean Areen
Receives Pro Bono Institute Award, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR. (Feb. 23, 2004),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/february.23.2004.html (announcing the recipient
of the 2004 Georgetown University Law Center Pro Bono Institute Award); Kanstroom Receives
Pro Bono Award, BOS. COLL. LAW (Oct. 2, 2007), http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/new
sevents/2007-archive/10207.html (announcing the 2007 recipient of the Boston College Law
School Faculty Pro Bono Award); Lawyering Program: Pro Bono, RUTGERS SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/pro-bono (last visited Jan. 19, 2011) (describing the pro bono
program at Rutgers School of Law, including the Pro Bono Award).
136. Many law firms prominently feature information about their pro bono activities by
offering a link on the firm's homepage. See, e.g., Arnold & Porter LLP, http://www.
amoldporter.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2011); Davis Polk, http://www.davispolk.com (last visited
Jan. 19, 2011); Hogan Lovells, http://www.hoganlovells.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2011); Sullivan
& Cromwell LLP, http://www.sullivanandcromwell.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2011).
137. According to Aristotle, society praises men when they endure a base or painful
experience in return for noble objects, and pardons negative acts executed under extreme pressure
that strains human nature. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, reprinted in DANIEL
R. COQUILLET-E, LAWYERS AND FUNDAMENTAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 42, 42-48 (1995).
Aristotle has a strong notion of individual responsibility and holds a person responsible for
voluntary acts taken with knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the act. Id.
138. Of course, reasonable lawyers can argue about whether and how these lawyers engaged
in the common good. See Abbe Smith, Can You be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 355-62 (2001).
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C. The Process of Lawyering: Intruding on Lawyer Autonomy
Once a lawyer agrees to represent a client, the loyalty owed to that client
restricts the personal actions the lawyer may take in his private capacity. I
Although the extent to which a client's position should interfere with a
lawyer's personal actions is debatable, a consensus on broad themes is
possible. A lawyer in his or her private capacity cannot directly undermine the
goals that the lawyer is trying to achieve in his or her professional role. For
example, it would likely be professional misconduct for a lawyer to argue in
tax court for a certain interpretation of a tax ruling, while simultaneously
publishing an article opposing that interpretation. 140  The lawyer would be
publicly providing arguments for the opposing side. And any opposing
counsel would prominently feature that article in briefs and arguments. More
troubling is the notion that a lawyer becomes a less-effective advocate for
some classes of potential clients if the lawyer takes a strong, public stand on a
contentious social issue.
14 1
Yet, even this broad distinction does not capture all the limits on a lawyer's
conduct. Suppose an attorney is representing a corporation that seeks to put a
power plant in a local community. That lawyer cannot represent the interests
of the corporation in obtaining a zoning variance by day and serve as an
organizer in the local community-action group to oppose the zoning variance
by night. 142 A client would inevitably see the lawyer as violating afundamental concept of loyalty. 143  In this example the law of zoning and
139. See CANONS OF ETHIcs Canon 31 (1908) ("The lawyer owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability .... (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2009) ("The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted
to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.").
140. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10; see also Wilkins, Race, Ethics,
and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 1061 (arguing that a black lawyer could not
simultaneously represent both the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
and the Ku Klux Klan).
141. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 5. Curtis remarks:
I cannot forget what one of the very best Boston trustees once told me. He had, of
course, in his many trusts large real estate holdings in Boston. He was a citizen of
Boston. He told me once that he either refused to contribute to the campaigns of
candidates for mayor or else he contributed to both of them, because, he said, "The
assessments on the real estate I hold in trust, things being as they are in Boston, would
be put in hazard if I were to come out definitely for a candidate and he lost." The better
trustee, and he was a good trustee, the worse a citizen.
Id.
142. See MARKOVITS, supra note 19, at 38 (noting that, in contrast to an actor who may play
a character but privately distance himself from the character's actions, an "effective
advocate . . . may not disparage her client's claims and moreover must, as is commonly said,
'exude confidence and enthusiasm that contribute to the credibility of his client's cause').
143. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. I (calling loyalty an "essential
element[] in the lawyer's relationship to a client").
[Vol. 60:275
The Moral Responsibility of the Corporate Lawyer
policy of site selection are closely aligned. The lawyer, therefore, would be
working in one forum to undo the benefit the lawyer is trying to achieve for the
client in another. This conduct is in conflict with the common conception of a
lawyer's professional obligation to a client.144 In reality therefore, agreeing to
represent a client may possibly interfere with the moral autonomy of the
lawyer. 145
Sometimes the personal/professional dichotomy of a lawyer may be so
difficult to balance that a lawyer cannot represent a client. 146 The Model Rules
allow a lawyer to deny representation to a client in this case, acknowledging
that the personal is not so easily distinguished from the professional. 147 Thus,
according to the Model Rules, a lawyer should not decline to represent a client
because of the client's unpopularity, but a lawyer may decline if his or her
personal views would impede representation. 
148
Finally, the lawyer is allowed, and strongly encouraged by some legal-ethics
scholars, to engage in fulsome counseling, including discussion on the moral
dimensions of the client's ends and means. 149 Professor Paul Tremblay has
observed that "the moral activism project" is "one of the most significant
intellectual developments in legal ethics in the twentieth century." 150 The
actual practice of "moral activism" is immensely more complicated than
simply presenting an argument to a client. 151 Differences in moral assessment
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (prohibiting a lawyer from allowing
personal interests to interfere with the representation of his or her client); cf Johnston v. Koppes,
850 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Loyalty to a client requires subordination of a lawyer's
personal interests when acting in a professional capacity. But loyalty to a client does not require
extinguishment of a lawyer's deepest convictions.").
145. Painter, supra note 6, at 517 ("Corporations are not autonomous, but rather corporate
decisions are made by people standing behind the corporate entities: directors, officers,
employees, and lawyers.... Lawyers also are not autonomous, rather their decisions and actions
are determined in part by business objectives of their clients.").
146. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.2(c) (permitting a lawyer to avoid
appointment only when "the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to
impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client").
147. Id.
148. See id. (stating that, although a lawyer may decline appointment because of repugnancy,
a lawyer still must "accept[] a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients" in
order to fulfill the pro bono responsibility).
149. See Paul R. Tremblay, Moral Activism Manqua, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 127, 150 (2002)
(stating that a lawyer committed to moral activism is likely to have ethical discussions with his
client). Legal codes of ethics also encourage the lawyer to consider morality when rendering
advice. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 ("In rendering advice a lawyer may refer
not only to the law but to other considerations such as moral ... factors, that may be relevant to
the client's situation."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 ("In assisting his client
to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may
lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible.").
150. Tremblay, supra note 149, at 130.
151. Id.; see also Ellmann, supra note 99, at 121-23 (discussing a lawyer's action of
disclosing moral advice to his client).
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are rarely about the ends (for example, do not kill), but about facts (for
example, this action will kill less people than the alternative action). 152 The
very fact of engaging in a counseling discussion reflects a vision of lawyering
quite far removed from a sterile claim that lawyers are not accountable for the
goals of their clients.
153
Closely related to this discussion, Richard Painter developed a critique of
nonaccountability in the corporate context based upon the interdependence of
attorneys and their corporate clients.1 54 Painter makes the argument that in
many contexts corporate attorneys are so intertwined with their clients that
they are morally accountable for the clients' actions.' 55 Although this is
perhaps true in many cases, this intertwining is not necessary to create moral
accountability. Even where there is no intertwining, in the corporate context
lawyers are still accountable because of the nature of the client and the
forward-looking, non-adversarial nature of the work.
D. The Process of Lawyering: Transforming the Lawyer and Information
Processing
In addition to professional responsibilities that align the client and his
attorney, there is a natural, human tendency to adapt to the position one
156 1 57
advocates. Lawyers are trained to see both sides of a disagreement. As a
result, even lawyers who do not start out agreeing with the goals of their clients
often come to be persuaded by constantly repeating their clients' point of
view. 1 58 Charles Curtis described this process of self-persuasion in this classic
passage:
It is profoundly true that the first person a lawyer persuades is
himself. A practicing lawyer will soon detect in himself a perfectly
astonishing amount of sincerity. By the time he has even sketched
out his brief, however skeptically he started, he finds himself
believing more and more in what it says, until he has to hark back to
his original opinion in order to orient himself. And later, when he
152. See Tremblay, supra note 149, at 130.
153. Id. at 150 (noting that lawyers "committed to morally ambitious practice" are more
likely to have these discussions and that accepting "moral activism" results in "more expression
of disagreement and efforts at persuasion by lawyers").
154. Painter, supra note 6, at 511 -18.
155. Id
156. See E. Donald Elliot, Against Ludditism: An Essay on the Perils of the (Mis)use of
Historical Analogies in Technology Assessment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 279, 284 (1991)
(acknowledging the human tendency to "analogize the new to the familiar"); Tremblay, supra
note 149, at 130 (noting that "most people believe what they want to be true" and discussing how
this concept operates with regard to the lawyer and his or her client).
157. David Schuman, Beyond the Waste Land: Law Practice in the 1990s, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
1, 11 (1990).
158. Tremblay, supra note 149, at 130.
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starts arguing the case before the court, his belief is total, and he is
quite sincere about it. 159
Psychological research has revealed the biases and information processes
that push a lawyer toward believing the factual assertions of a client. 160
Economic incentives add an additional impetus for a lawyer to align his or her
views with those of a client. 161 Through this mental alignment, the character of
the lawyer is changed. Aristotle concluded that character is acquired through
both teaching and habit, and reinforced through conduct.' 62 If a lawyer takes
on an amoral, "hired gun" approach to representation, it could have
long-lasting effects on the lawyer. George Orwell's famous essay, "Shooting
an Elephant," captured this idea vividly with this phrase: "[h]e wears a mask,
and his face grows to fit it." 163 Indeed, many have observed cases in which
"the role consume[s] the person."'1 64
The dynamics of representation are, of course, more complicated than this
discussion implies. The process of change works both ways. Lawyers can
influence their clients through conversation and counseling-the "moral
activism" noted above. 165 Such a conversation is not easy, and some lawyers
159. Curtis, supra note 7, at 13.
160. Tremblay, supra note 149, at 130.
161. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Policies and Cultures of Organization: The Tournament at the
Intersection of Business and Legal Ethics, I ST. THOMAS L.J. 909, 917 (2004).
162. ARISTOTLE, supra note 137, at 47; see also R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context:
What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to "Seek Justice," 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 644 (2006) ("Only by putting the virtues into practice does the good
become integrated in our character."); Ian Mangham, Character and Virtue in an Era of
Turbulent Capitalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION THEORY 502, 504
(Haridimos Tsoukas & Christian Knudsen eds., 2003) (stating that Aristotelian logic suggests that
character is "acquired through teaching and habituation"). This reflects the reality that there are
few clear positions regarding ethical scenarios facing lawyers. However, simply because there
may often be legitimate countervailing concerns does not imply that lawyers cannot or should not
choose one position over another, or that lawyers cannot label the position they choose as the
morally correct position.
163. George Orwell, Shooting an Elephant, in TRIAL AND ERROR: AN OXFORD ANTHOLOGY
OF LEGAL STORIES 213, 213 (Fred. R. Shapiro & Jane Garry eds., 1998). One author discusses
Orwell's personal experiences and the role of the lawyer as follows:
Like Orwell, the lawyer may not like what she is doing and may not like herself very
much for doing it. She may feel a stifling sense of being trapped in her role with no
way out. Yet rather than face these doubts openly, the lawyer's moral paralysis may be
transmuted into anger at others, and so she may find herself experiencing the same sort
of unreasoning hostility towards her clients that Orwell felt towards the Burmese
people he was sent to serve.
Joseph Allegretti, Shooting Elephants, Serving Clients: An Essay on George Orwell and the
Attorney-Client Relationship, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 12 (1993).
164. Smith, supra note 138, at 397.
165. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 66-67 (1994) (discussing a lawyer's approach to a moral dialogue
between his client and himself); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An
Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1546-48 (1995)
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would choose to engage in this discussion only in those relatively rare
situations in which the lawyer is factually certain that the client is using
questionable means or pursuing a questionable end. 166 Other lawyers might
embrace the position urged by Professor Robert Vischer, which acknowledges
that moral perspective is inextricably intertwined in legal representation and
should be more openly recognized. 167 Other lawyers might embrace
corporate-transactional lawyering to assure that a richer and more nuanced
dialogue occurs in the representation. With powerful corporate agents, lawyers
are less likely to be concerned with paternalism and overcoming the autonomy
of the corporate client.' 68 And, although the corporate agents who partake in
the discussion may feel the constraints of their corporate role, the financial
pressure that those agents can exert on their attorneys should not be
understated. The economic effect of a client firing a public defender as a result
of a moral disagreement is much less than the effect of a corporate attorney
losing a major client-and potentially much of his book of business. Both who
the lawyer represents and how the lawyer embraces his or her role are choices
that the legal community should not be afraid to discuss or improve by
suggesting a better, normative approach. In the words of Professor Russell
Pearce, we should move the conversation of moral accountability "to the center
of the bar's legal ethics conversations."
69
III. THE PUBLIC DOES NOT EMBRACE A BROAD CLAIM OF
NONACCOUNTABILITY
Historically, the messenger is often confused with the message. Several
aspects of lawyering-the ability to choose clients, the social and political
alignment between some lawyers and their clients, and the impact of client
choice on lawyer autonomy-support the not-uncommon inference that
because some lawyers align with their clients, all lawyers do. All of these
lawyering aspects undoubtedly play a role in the public's lukewarm acceptance
of the concept of nonaccountability, at least as to client selection. 70 Moreover,
[hereinafter Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law] (observing how a lawyer can influence a
client's actions by providing or abstaining from providing his or her relevant knowledge of the
law).
166. See Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law, supra note 165, at 1546-48 (discussing
the lawyer's role when he or she believes the client is engaged in or has a goal of illegal activity).
167. Vischer, supra note 81, at 228-29.
168. Professors John Conley and Scott Baker pose a fascinating question of whether there has
been a switch in the level of autonomy and professionalism in large firms, as compared to small
firms, over the last fifty years. See John M. Conley & Scott Baker, Fall from Grace or Business
as Usual? A Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street, 30 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 783, 784, 796-97 (2005).
169. Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers Are Morally Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1805, 1808 (2002).
170. Smith, supra note 138, at 355-62 (describing the public's view of prosecutors and
criminal defense counsel, and noting that the latter "are barely tolerated").
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the fact that an individual lawyer may sometimes reject a client because of the
client's goals reinforces the view that the choice to represent a client conveys
at least modest imprimatur of the client's goals.
Personal beliefs are usually manifest in acts-what a person says; advocates
for; and gives time, energy, and commitment to are all outward clues as to
what he or she believes. Thus, it is understandable why the public and other
lawyers often impute a client's motivations to the lawyer, despite the principle
of nonaccountability. 1 Although the public's perception is arguably
grounded in a misunderstanding of the "theatre" of lawyering, lawyers need to
respond to this perception lest the public lose faith in lawyers as instruments of
justice.172
Ironically, the more that lawyers develop strong personal views that indicate
that they are not for hire only to the highest bidder, the more others will draw
an inference of a shared personal belief between the lawyer and his or her
client, and the more the public will view with skepticism the claim of
nonaccountability.
Because the public already associates lawyers with their clients, it is fair to
ask what lawyers gain from their belief that they are not accountable. The
most powerful argument is that lawyers must embrace this concept at least as
to criminal-defense counsel, who represent the weakest and most unpopular
members of society. Unfortunately, just the opposite of the intended result
occurs. By adhering to the overly general notion of nonaccountability, lawyers
sometimes fail to provide the adversarial and rule-of-law justifications that are
at the heart of the criminal defense counsel's role. This failure results, in
particular, from those who assert nonaccountability for areas of practice, such
as corporate-transactional work, for which the justifications for
nonaccountability are weakest.1 73 If, instead, lawyers defended their actions
before the public based on either systemic justifications or the content of their
171. See, e.g., MARK J. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT: THE UNSEEN POWER OF
WASHINGTON LAWYERS 27 (1975). Green provides an example of this perception, noting
attorney Dean Acheson's advocacy of South African and Rhodesian regimes:
[Covington and Burling] did represent South Africa, but not Rhodesia. Although such
exploitation of public stature for private clients is disappointing, it is unlikely that a
mere client could persuade someone as strong-minded as Acheson to publicly defend
reactionary regimes. No, Dean Acheson deserved to be taken at his word, for he
believed in the regimes he defended.
Id.; see also Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 379, 388 (1987) (comparing the lawyer's role to that of an actor and stating that
"the lawyer's job requires that he totally conceal his performance").
172. See Post, supra note 171, at 388-89. The public reaction to the lawyers' representation
of unpopular clients and causes is similar to the problem that actors face when they have played
"the bad guy" and find themselves stopped on the street by fans and scolded for their behavior.
Lawyers, however, have more difficulty distinguishing themselves because they do not have the
clear delineation between their personal and professional (their "role") behavior as do actors.
173. See supra Part II.
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work, the public might become better educated and gain a deeper appreciation
for the legal system and the value that lawyers add to society.
Ultimately, whether the legal profession accepts the principle of
nonaccountability, there may be little or no difference in how lawyers choose
to accept clients. As this Article has emphasized, there is a distinction between
accepting the moral consequences of one's actions and altering one's behavior
to avoid them. It is likely that even if there were widespread disapproval of
nonaccountability in the legal profession, most attomeys would still accept the
same clients as long as those clients were able to pay. Without
nonaccountability, individual attorneys could be challenged based on the
consequences of their work, and those attorneys would have to respond with a
more thoughtful answer than a global claim that they are never accountable for
their actions taken on behalf of their clients.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the pervasive notion that lawyers are never accountable for the goals
of their clients, the inexorable conclusion is that the public and many lawyers
believe lawyers are accountable, at least sometimes. Scholarly literature
presents an increasingly common refrain: "[1]awyers must assume personal
moral responsibility for the consequences of their professional actions." 1 4 It is
fair for both the public and the legal community to ask individual lawyers why
they chose to represent certain clients, and how the work on behalf of those
clients helps the common good.
175
With each client a lawyer represents, the lawyer must determine whether the
justification for nonaccountability applies to his or her client's representation
and must be able to respond with a forceful argument for the representation
when questioned. In particular, if lawyers operate in the zone of free enterprise
where nonaccountability does not apply, they need to be ready to defend their
choice of representation with reference to its social value and not simply to the
justice system in which lawyers practice. It is likely that most corporate
lawyers can readily respond to challenges or, at the very least, make note that
their work has not had a noticeable negative social impact. Occasionally,
lawyers may not be able to respond to challenges to their roles as attorneys
174. Rhode, supra note 65, at 643; see also Murray L. Schwartz, Symposium, The Law Firm
as a Social Institution: Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice: Comment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 653,
656-57 (1985) (reviewing Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 389 (1985)) (discussing Rhode's assertions).
175. This Article is certainly not alone in coming to this conclusion. See Hodes, supra note
95, at 982, 990 (stating that lawyers should have full freedom to choose clients, including on
moral grounds, and those choices should be capable of public justification); Rhode, supra note
65, at 643 ("Lawyers must assume personal moral responsibility for the consequences of their
professional actions."). This Article also recognizes that there may be a wealth of complications
when a lawyer's personal attributes are used to overtly or subtly support the client's goals, such as
a black lawyer representing the Ku Klux Klan or a Jewish lawyer representing Nazis. Wilkins,
Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 1042.
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because they see only a small part of the larger goal. And, sometimes, just
sometimes, the lawyer may look at the client's goal and recognize that he or
she cannot justify representing that client.
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